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Unlocking Morality from Criminal Law 
Thom Brooks 
 
Abstract. This review article critically examines R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green’s wide-
ranging Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law. The book captures well a crucial debate 
at the heart of its topic: is morality a key for understanding criminal law? I first consider legal 
moralism arguments answering this question in the affirmative and argue they should be 
rejected. I next consider alternatives to argue that philosophers of criminal law should look 
beyond legal moralism for more compelling theories about criminal law. 
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Introduction 
Does the criminal law have a philosophical foundation? A common answer is that some view 
of morality provides a key for unlocking the criminal law. If we considered what might serve 
as the foundation for the criminalisation and even punishment of crimes like murder, theft or 
sex offences, the immorality of these crimes seems important and perhaps even crucial. But is 
it? Or should it? 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law is a ground-breaking work divided into 
four parts: criminal law and political theory, the substance of criminal law, international 
criminal law and a brief section on criminal procedures. The contributors include some of the 
most reputable and influential scholars in the field, including Andrew Ashworth, Mitchell 
Berman, Markus Dubber, Douglas Husak, Nicola Lacey, Michael Moore, the editors and 
many more. Their essays cover a suitably wide-range of topics and issues that is fitting for 
the diversity of their influential contributions to the field. Like most edited collections, there 
is no one view or perspective adopted throughout. The book claims to be foundational ‘in 
relation to the questions that it raises and clarifies, to the approaches to those questions that 
its contributors explore and develop, and to the further debates and inquiries that it hopes to 
provoke among criminal law theorists’.1 The essays are generally excellent in this landmark 
volume that will be essential reading for anyone interested in this exciting area. Any critical 
comments about the field through this book’s essays should not mask my admiration for the 
authors and their contributions. This is a truly first-rate collection and the co-editors are to be 
congratulated for their efforts. 
In this review article, I will not survey the full contents of this important collection as 
I cannot do full justice to the richness of the complete set of essays offered. Instead, I focus 
on a specific issue: the relationship between morality and the criminal law. In their 
introduction to this collection, R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green reject the view that there is any 
one key to understanding the criminal law.
2
 We have various perspectives that can bring 
insights whether they are philosophical, sociological or otherwise. Nonetheless, they support 
a ‘task of rational reconstruction’ that is somewhat ‘Herculean’ and look outwards ‘to some 
                                                 
1
 R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green, ‘Introduction’ in R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 11. 
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 Duff and Green, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 
set of moral or political values that we can suppose the law to be embedded to embody’.3 
This does not entail we construct theories of criminal law divorced from our current 
practices. On the contrary, ‘any normative theorizing must begin from where we, the 
theorizers, are, within our particular context; nor can we sensibly aspire to break free from all 
such contexts, to take a God’s eye view or a view from nowhere, and articulate a universal 
normative theory of what the criminal law, as such, ought to be’.4 
So in this vein, I will consider the general philosophy of criminal law as connected to 
our practical context while attempting to reveal normative insights into how our practical 
commitments should be best understood. The next section surveys some arguments in 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law that defend a more legal moralist perspective. 
This is followed by a section considering arguments defending a more political viewpoint. 
My discussion will be wide-ranging without being exhaustive to advance the view that there 
is a balance between theory and practice to be struck and the legal moralists are on the wrong 
side. Whatever else the philosophical foundations of criminal law, legal moralist theories are 
too disconnected from our practices to foster a compelling view of the criminal law. 
Philosophers of criminal law should look elsewhere. 
 
Legal Moralism and Criminal Law 
The first perspective is legal moralism. This is broadly defined as the view that the criminal 
law and morality are intimately connected, and there is a clear link to the natural law 
tradition.
5
 Legal moralism is defended by R. A. Duff, the co-editor of Philosophical 
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Foundations of Criminal Law. His piece defends a particular view about the relation of law 
and morality that I want to unpack and explore further: 
The criminal law, in its substantive dimension, defines certain types of conduct as 
criminal . . . In so doing, it defines and condemns such conduct as wrong: not merely, 
and trivially, as legally wrong, as a breach of the rules of this particular game, but as 
morally wrong in a way that should concern those to whom it speaks, and that 
warrants the further consequences (trial, conviction, and punishment) that it attaches 
to such conduct. To say that it defines such conduct as wrong is not, however, to say 
that it creates that wrongfulness: although it is trivially true that criminal conduct is 
criminally wrongful only because the criminal law so defines it, it is substantively 
false to say that such conduct is morally wrongful only because the criminal law 
defines it as wrong. The criminal law does not (cannot) turn conduct that was not 
already wrongful into a moral wrong: it does not determine, but presupposes, the 
moral wrongfulness of the conduct that it defines as criminal; it determines which pre-
criminal wrongs should count as ‘public’ wrongs whose perpetrators are to be called 
to public account.
6
 
For Duff, what is ‘criminal’ is not only legal wrong, but it is also ‘morally wrong’. Duff 
denies that the conduct identified as criminal is morally wrong because it is criminal. He 
says: ‘We do not need the criminal law to tell us that rape, murder, and other attacks on the 
person are wrong’ and so should be criminalised.7 The criminal law does no more than select 
which pre-criminal wrongs for itself. In other words, the wrongs we include in our criminal 
law are wrong prior to our creating the criminal law. Moral wrongs would exist in a society 
without any law. Only moral wrongs can be incorporated within the criminal law, but not all 
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moral wrongs are criminalised.
8
 This raises important questions about how these pre-criminal 
(and pre-societal?) wrongs came into being, if they even exist, and what might explain 
changes in our understandings of these wrongs over time—although I will bracket this issue 
because it is not examined in this piece.
9
  
 We need a test to determine which moral wrongs should count as criminal and which 
do not. Duff’s test is that only those wrongs where ‘perpetrators are to be called to public 
account’ should be part of the criminal law.10 To be held to ‘public account’ does not entail 
that conduct must be performed in public and Duff includes receiving even a formal caution 
as being held publicly.
11
 This test seems to suggest that the wrongs are more substantial than 
not to warrant their meriting potential public accountability, but the standard remains 
somewhat vague and unclear how it might be applied. 
 Crimes that are wrong, but not immoral would cause serious problems for legal 
moralist views like Duff’s. He accepts that crimes are wrong independently of their 
criminalisation, that they are mala in se. These offences are typically claimed to include 
murder, theft and rape because they are often thought wrongful whether or not a state 
criminalises them. Other crimes are thought to be mala prohibita, such as drug offences and 
traffic offences. Driving a few miles above a speed limit might increase risks to other drivers 
for many motorists, but it is not obviously true this is the case for expert stunt drivers or 
Formula One champions. These mala prohibita offences are thought to only be wrongful 
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because they are illegal. Nor is it clear that possessing a substance like cannabis is immoral 
prior to its criminalisation in U.S. states where it is banned, but not in U.S. states where it is 
now legalised.  
These mala prohibita crimes cause problems for legal moralists and they deny such 
crimes exist. If some offences are wrongful only because they are prohibited by law, then not 
all crimes are wrongful independently of their illegality and the link between law and 
morality is incomplete, if not inapplicable. So if there were no mala prohibita crimes, then 
legal moralism would be able to claim morality has a clear link to criminal law. 
 Duff acknowledges this problem facing legal moralist views like his. He claims there 
are two paths to criminalisation. The first is by identifying potential mala in se offences that 
are wrongful independent of their illegality. The second is more vague and ‘starts with a 
decision that we have a reason to regulate a particular type of conduct, a reason that does not 
depend on the wrongfulness of the conduct’.12 For example, we might choose to regulate 
driving speeds.
13
 Duff argues that ‘we have good reason to criminalize such breaches if and 
only if, given the regulation and its justification, a breach of it constitutes a moral wrong for 
which the perpetrator should be called to public account’.14 Some crimes might only wrongs 
in relation to fellow citizens, such as ‘electoral misconduct’ or failing to pay taxes owed.15 So 
Duff’s legal moralism retains morality as the key to unlocking what is criminal by claiming 
all criminal offences are either wrong independently of their criminalisation or there is some 
‘good reason’ to criminalise. 
 One problem with Duff’s analysis is that it seemingly divides offences into one group 
(e.g., mala in se offences) that are inherently wrongful and a second group of the rest for 
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which we merely have some good reason to include them in the criminal law. This division is 
a concern because it a crime’s being inherently wrongful is not what matters most: the key is 
what we have good reason to criminalise and not just that conduct is wrongful independently 
of criminalisation. The fact a crime is wrongful in this way could serve as a good reason for 
its criminalisation, but the true test then is whether conduct meets the standard of a good 
reason for criminalisation whatever that might be. So this division between offence groups 
seems false. If there is some difference between these groups, it is curious that it is unclear 
how this is captured by punishment—for example, by punishing crimes of one group 
generally more than another to reflect their difference. But this also does not seem the case 
and so a further reason why this difference seems false. 
 A second problem with Duff’s analysis is its understanding of morality. For Duff, we 
can identify a coherent conception of ‘wrongfulness’: the punishment of offenders can 
express ‘our’ public denunciation to them for which offenders can communicate their secular 
penance.
16
 But society rarely speaks with such a voice, as H. L. A. Hart argues: 
it is sociologically very naïve to think that there is even in England a single 
homogeneous social morality whose mouthpiece the judge can be in fixing sentence . 
. . Our society whether we like it or not, is morally a plural society; and the 
judgements of the relative seriousness of different crimes vary within it far more than 
this simple theory recognizes.
17
 
Our present age is characterised by the fact of reasonable pluralism in every society. The 
moral reasons in favour of criminalisation, conviction, sentencing and release from custody 
can differ widely even where there is general agreement on outcomes. For example, both the 
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retributivist and utilitarian can agree that murderers should be executed, but each will have 
very different reasons for their judgements. Duff’s discussion of morality fails to account 
sufficiently for society’s normative diversity. There is no single moral view all accept, but a 
sea of normative difference. This is not to deny that the criminal law may embody 
normativity, but it does deny that the normative views of any society support any single 
moral view.
18
 Such worries for Duff’s legal moralism exist because these considerations are 
absent from his account. 
 Duff is the leading legal moralist today, but he is not alone in defending this position 
in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law.
19
 Legal moralism can take other forms, such 
as defending a particular moral principle as central to determining whether conduct is 
criminal. One such principle is the harm principle and it is perhaps the most influential such 
principle. John Stuart Mill’s original formulation focuses on the possibility of an individual’s 
causing harm to another is sufficient to constrain his freedom: 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
20
 
Mill’s harm principle supports the view that we should criminalise conduct that threatens or 
inflicts harm to others. This moral perspective prioritises the importance of harming over 
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motivation: unintended harms may be thought less wrong than intentional harming, but both 
would count as immoral conduct that may require sanctions.  
 This perspective is developed further by Victor Tadros in his contribution to this 
volume.
21
 He argues that we first consider whether conduct is permissible and, if so, only 
then consider motivations to determine the level of an individual’s blameworthiness. Tadros 
claims the harm principle is our guide to ascertaining permissible conduct: 
Whether something is permissible or not is to be determined by the harm that it 
causes. Hence, the harm principle is still commonly regarded as the standard principle 
that must be satisfied to warrant criminalization. If and only if principles of 
criminalization are satisfied do we turn to the fault requirements that must be satisfied 
to render the defendant liable to a criminal conviction for his conduct.
22
 
Like Duff, Tadros does not believe all immoral conduct should be criminalized or punished. 
White lies can be tolerated, but murder cannot. Duff and Tadros differ on where they 
demarcate non-criminal immorality from criminal immorality. Duff claims the latter 
constitutes conduct where individuals should be held publicly to account, even if only a brief 
verbal warning from a traffic officer. Tadros claims that our conduct must at least be harmful 
to consider criminalisation and then we apply a second test of considering an individual’s 
motivations to determine relative blameworthiness for possible punishment. So Tadros’s 
moral standard appears more stringent than Duff’s. 
 But there remain serious concerns for Tadros’s account. This view of harm is both 
overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive in its including too much as harms. Few 
argue all harms to others should be criminalized. Conduct like dangerous play in sports, 
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 See Victor Tadros, ‘Wrongdoing and Motivation’ in R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green (eds), Philosophical 
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invasive surgery and prize fighting are activities where a person can be harmed. Tadros 
seems to argue that this conduct would not be criminal because while it meets a first test of 
harm to others it fails a second about our motivations in interacting with others. There is a 
difference between prize fighting and a street brawl. Prize fighters box in a ring according to 
agreed rules that all consent to, but street brawlers need have no such agreements: the former 
is a widely recognized sport while the latter is commonly viewed as pure violence.
23
 Tadros 
does not appear to accept that prize fighting should be punished because boxers consent to 
participate, but it does involve an intentional harm to others meeting his first step: it is 
unclear if such conduct is ‘wrongful, but unpunishable’.24 If so, Tadros’s understanding of 
harm’s importance for the criminal law may be too wide.25 
 But this view of harm is also underinclusive. This is because it does not appear to 
include much conduct that would be criminalised by most of us. So-called self-regarding 
harms seem a particular problem for this view and they interestingly fall outside much of the 
discussion. These are harms to one’s own self. Crimes of this variety are thought to include 
many drug offences and perhaps prostitution. The harm, if any, is to the person using the drug 
or engaging in sex work. Self-regarding offences are controversial insofar as some might 
deny their moral relevance for criminalisation: for example, a libertarian defending the 
importance of autonomous consent might deny I can harm myself where I autonomously 
consent to subject myself to risks. Other offences might not harm anyone, such as driving in 
the wrong direction on a one way street or illegal parking—especially if, in fact, no one is 
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 I grant this example has limitations. I oppose the legality of boxing, but use this illustration because few I 
have met share my views about its wrongfulness. 
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 Paraphrasing Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 28. 
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 See Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Just Prevention: Preventative Rationales and the Limits of the 
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affected by my conduct.
26
 Such cases of self-regarding offences and what we might call 
harmless offences, if they exist, cause problems for Tadros’s account because they appear to 
fall outside his account of the criminal law. This opens a gulf between his account and a wide 
number of offences that about every criminal code includes—and which many of us would 
include in our understanding of what does and should constitute the criminal law. So Tadros 
may offer a more stringent view of how law and morality relate than Duff, but legal moralism 
remains problematic. 
 
Against Legal Moralism 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law contains several insightful pieces developing a 
broadly legal moralist understanding of criminal law as discussed in the section above. Duff, 
a co-editor, is a chief proponent of this view. Curiously, his co-editor Stuart Green raises 
some interesting challenges to legal moralism that begin to lead us away to other more 
convincing alternatives. This section focuses on these arguments against legal moralism 
found in this collection. 
 Green considers what he calls ‘just deserts in unjust societies’.27 Most legal moralists 
are retributivists and so they accept a connection between desert and proportional 
punishment.
28
 Individuals deserve punishment for the moral wrongdoing they brought about 
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may increase risks to safety or at least cause inconvenience. But this is not necessarily true for every case. If no 
one was driving on the street, no one was present and no one was aware, then my driving the wrong direction on 
a one way street would not affect others. It might even be morally defended if my doing so helped me rescue 
another in distress or more swiftly get someone to a hospital for urgent treatment. 
27
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Green (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 352—
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 While Duff defends what he calls a communicative theory of punishment, I have elsewhere argued that his 
theory is essentially retributivist because punishment is only to be distributed to the deserving in relation to what 
is deserved not unlike many retributivist penal theories. Duff’s communicative theory is not clearly distinctive 
from retributivism in certain fundamental respects. See Brooks, Punishment, pp. 101—22. On retributivism 
and punished in proportion to their desert. Retributivism considers each offender individually 
to determine how much desert he possesses. If I am fully responsible for a grave wrong like 
murder, then retributivism would find me deserving a fittingly severe punishment. 
 Green examines this view of just deserts in the non-ideal conditions that characterise 
many communities. He argues we should consider individuals on a case by case basis in 
viewing the relationship between retribution and socio-economic justice. The fact that an 
offender is ‘deeply and unjustly disadvantaged might be relevant to determining his 
blameworthiness for committing one kind of criminal offence (say, an offence against the 
person) but not another (say, an offence against property or against the administration of 
justice’ or vice versa.29 Unjust disadvantage may or may not matter for determining what is 
deserved depending on the specific context, ‘the precise form that the offender’s 
disadvantage takes’.30 Someone denied reasonable opportunities to obtain shelter might be a 
crucial factor for considering her blameworthiness for committing a relevant offence or 
perhaps form a basis for an excuse defence.
31
 
 Green’s analysis differs substantially from Duff’s legal moralism. For Duff, society 
has no more right to prosecute and punish an impoverished and excluded defendant who 
committed a serious mala in se offence than it would to prosecute an impoverished defendant 
that committed a much less serious mala prohibita offence according to Green.
32
 Green’s 
critique exposes a new problem for legal moralism: that it considers the morality of 
individuals equally and gives no weight to how factors like background considerations of 
socio-economic justice impact on them, which it does. So even if legal moralism could 
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32
 Green, ‘Just Deserts in Unjust Societies’, p. 364. 
cohere better with the criminal law, it still has a problem accounting for the realities within 
which crimes may take place. 
A more direct critique of legal moralism is by Malcolm Thorburn. He argues that 
Duff’s ‘new-fangled legal moralism cannot succeed . . . because it is premised on trying to 
turn criminal justice into something that it is not . . . the legal moralist view just does not fit 
with existing doctrine’.33 Thorburn argues there is a difference between legal systems and 
private moral practices. The criminal law is an institutional system, but our private moral 
practices are not. We might speak of punishing a child or perhaps a pet for their disapproved 
conduct. But private moral practices may differ widely from one home to the next on what is 
disapproved, whether this standard is consistent and what consequences may follow. This is 
different in kind and character from legal punishment following a criminal law inclusive of 
all, where there are institutional compromises and precedents, and an appeal process. 
 In response, Thorburn defends a public law account of criminal justice. This 
perspective is more positivist insofar as it seeks to provide ‘a much better fit with existing 
doctrine than the moralist alternative’.34 But rather than focus on a moral justification of 
criminal justice, it is centred on a political justification.
35
 The difference is that many claims 
about the justification of the criminal law are concerned with the justified exercise of 
coercive state power. Legal moralism is a problem because it can ‘ignore the many ways in 
which the criminal law regulates public power’.36 
 Thorburn is correct to highlight the political nature of the criminal law.
37
 His public 
law perspective is useful in keeping us grounded in the criminal law as part of a particular 
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institution. But it still runs the risk of being too conservative if it endorsed a criminal code 
because it existed. We require an approach that can connect to our practices while able to 
speak to their development. 
 A possible illustration of such an account might be Richard Dagger’s republican view 
of criminal law.
38
 Republicanism understands freedom as non-domination.
39
 We are 
dominated when we are subjected to an arbitrary power. A benevolent dictator that never 
caused us harm or threatened others would still dominate because he would retain the power 
to arbitrarily harm or threaten us. We enjoy republican freedom when the laws that bind us 
are not arbitrarily governing us, but discursively controlled through deliberative self-
government. We are not dominated when we can exercise this type of control. State 
punishment for murder is not a form of domination where our community chose this sanction 
through public deliberation open to all citizens. Punishment is not an imposition of one 
arbitrary will over others, but a product of deliberation where each individual may contribute. 
We are the collective authors of our laws in republican theory. 
 Dagger claims that crimes are one of many forms whereby an individual can exercise 
arbitrary power over another. Crime is not a private matter between affected persons, but ‘an 
important part of the public’s business’ as a real threat to the liberties of all.40 For Dagger, 
republicanism is about the rule of law and republicanism’s understanding of criminal law is 
an example of this view.  
One interesting consequence is that Dagger’s republicanism appears to reject a key 
part of perhaps the most well known republican theories of criminal justice, namely, John 
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Braithwaite’s defence of restorative justice.41 Restorative justice is an alternative to the 
formal trial process. Instead of the adversarial courtroom determining sentencing, restorative 
justice is an informal process bringing together the victim, offender and their support 
networks led by a trained facilitator. The aim is to create a dialogue fostering mutual 
understanding and healing. Offenders must accept their guilt to participate and typically 
apologise to victims. Their punishment is not determined by a judge, but through deliberation 
in a restorative setting to help ‘restore’ the offender as a law-abiding member of our 
community. Braithwaite defends restorative justice as republican because it is a deliberative 
process without domination. But Dagger likely rejects this because restorative justice 
removes such cases away from the public trial to the private meeting room.
42
 
 But Dagger need not do so. Restorative justice empowers the public by giving those 
with a stake like victims, offenders and their families a say.
43
 Outcomes are not imposed from 
above, but a product of deliberation from below. No one is coerced to participate unlike a 
criminal trial.
44
 Restorative justice can shrug off the less flexible but heavier weight of state 
power in favour of a more flexible and better tailored to serving public justice. Studies have 
found that using restorative justice can yield several improvements over courtroom 
sentencing: there is much higher participant satisfaction, lower reoffending of up to 25% and 
significant cost savings.
45
 This is not to say restorative justice is perfect or in no need of 
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further reform, as I have argued for elsewhere.
46
 But it is to say restorative justice is 
compatible with republican theories of criminal law among other theories. 
 
Conclusion  
This review article has surveyed the contributions to Duff and Green’s fascinating 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law by considering how its chapters address an 
important issue in the philosophy of criminal law. This issue concerns the relation of morality 
to the criminal law. I first discussed legal moralists like Duff that defend a strong connection 
between law and morality. I argued this perspective is not compelling. It rests on problematic 
assumptions about social morality, the moral content of the criminal law and the importance 
of context. I next explored alternatives advancing a more political understanding that seem to 
overcome the problems faced by legal moralism. While my discussion is not exhaustive, it 
should make clear that the balance between theory and practice to be struck as noted in Duff 
and Green’s introduction is not achieved by legal moralists. Whatever else the philosophical 
foundations of criminal law, legal moralist theories are too disconnected from our practices to 
foster a compelling view of the criminal law.
47
 
 To conclude, this critical comment is not a criticism of Duff and Green’s book. 
Instead, it is a statement about the wider field of the philosophy of criminal law that the 
book’s contents contribute towards. Duff and Green should be congratulated for producing 
the best collection available on this topic encompassing a range of interesting and sometimes 
competing voices that will be of enormous benefit to anyone with an interest in the topic. 
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